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SOBE SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TIlE SOUTH
(By Earl D. C. Bret·1 er, Professor of Sociology and Religion, Canqler
School of Theology, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia 30322. ':~
For use in the Southeastern Regional Consultation of the General
Board of Education, November 4-8, 19611., j~tlanta, Georgia.)
It is a privilege to speak on this theme in this conference. Especially so,
since you are concerned with the nurture and mission of the Christian faith and
its implications for modern life. Only the arrogant or the ignorant would assume
the time or talent to do more than trace in a tentative outline some of the important aspects of the topic. Most of this sl~etch Hill be familiar background to
most of you. Yet this very familiarity soothes our sensitivity, solidifies our
stereotypes, smoothes out the sharpness of contrasts, and makes sameness out of
strangeness. Paradoxically t ~le tend to knotV both most and least about the things
closest to us. Let us try to stand back from our Southland and revie~11 a general
picture painted with a few broad strokes.
The Southland is a regional part of the nation. A region stresses its Ot-ID
uniqueness l-Jithin the unity of the nation. Sometimes the South has acted like a
section, stressing its individuality against the national unity. He are celebrating during this decade the centennial of a terrible war resulting from these
sectionalistic tendencies breaking apart our federal union. Certainly our socalled "southern ",ay of life" roots its past in the plantation system, in rural ism,
in a segregated bi-racial pattern, states' rights, and fundamentalistic Protestantism. Each of these traditional elements is being challenged by national trends.
Plantation-type agriculture is giving Hay to mechanized farming, industrialism is
overcoming ruralism, integration of the races is biting into the old doctrine of
segregation, states' rights political views are constantly being bombarded by
centralized federal government, and an uneasy conscience is appearing in Protestant religious circles. The Sout ~is, indeed, a region in ferment.
To outsiders, the region may seem to be the "Solid South," and many insiders
are lulled into this same monolithic vieu. But to students of the South it is a
land of contrasts, a region of subregions, a mosaic of vivid differences. There
is the old plantation area running from the ocean coastline or the river delta to
the hill country. This is the usual stereotype of the "glory that l-laS the Old
South. I t Next is the piedmont or hilly area, running in several states bad: to the
mountains. This is the area that industrialized first and notll tends to approximate the national norms more closely than any other part of the South. The mountain sections of several southern states constitute another subregion recently
emerging from the isolation and individualism, the poverty and puritanism characteristic of American frontiers. Uithin these three broad subregions there are
others. Perhaps the most important subregionalization of the South today is
that of metropolitan subregions and nonmetropolitan or rural subregions. There
are many souths, not one. Let us hold this caution sign over any broad sweeping
generalizations about the South, including our o~m.
Basically, the South is a region of traditionalism in transition. Some
point tli th pride to the achievements of our forefathers. Others tJorship the
"southern ~"ay of life" as a religion. Some vietl1 tlith alarm changes in the old
patterns. Hanyare sovereign southerners before they are Americans--Americans
before they are Christians. Yet everYHhere traditionalism is in transition.
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In this process metropolitan and urban centers tend to press for change ,-, hile
rural counties are likely to resist the pressure. The old '.Jays are giving ,~ay to
new l-Jays. The question is not uhether to change or not to change, because change
is inevitable--the only constant. The question, rather, is what changes to encourage and embrace, t-, hat to accept in acquiescence, l-Jhat to resist and reject.
Every southerner l-Jill find himself confronting such questions. His posture t-1ill
reflect his attachment to our southern heritage, his comprehension of our national
ideals, and his commitment to the Christian faith. Yes, the South is changing,
but from tJhat to '-1hat and for \Olhat?
It is the purpose of this paper to reviet-J a fel-J characteristics, conditions,
and changes in southern society and to indicate some of the challenges with which
they confront the Christian Church. Special attention will be given to the traditional values of southern culture, the changes in the churches, population characteristics, economic conditions, the racial situation, politics, and areas of disorganization resulting from rapid social changes. In conclusion, a few implications for the t-Jork of the church will be suggested.
In an excellent book titled Southern Tradition ~ Regional Progress,
Dr. I1icholls identifies flthose elements of Southern tradition l-1hich may be appropriately associated t'lith southern poverty and whose abandonment may be a prerequisite i f the South is finally to put an end to its poverty.
fI

vlilliam H. Nicholls, Southern Tradition ~ Regional Progress, Chapel
Hill, University of north Carolina Press, 1960.
He goes on to state,

it is my principal thesis here that the South's serious lag in per
capita incomes is largely attributable to its insufficient rate of industrial-urban development and that the South's lag in industrial development is in substantial part the result of its stubborn adherence to a set
of values inconsistent with a high rate of industrialization. So much
said, I now turn to the heart of my analysis. Uhat are the key elements
in the distinctively Southern tradition, Hay of life, and state of mind
which have hampered regional economic progress? The list is long but can
be classified for convenience into five principal categories: (1) the
persistence of agrarian values, (2) the rigidity of the social structure,
(3) the undemocratic nature of the political structure, (4) the l1eakness
of social responsibility, and (5) conformity of thought and behavior.
fI • • •

fI

Nicholls, pp. 14-15.
near the conclusion of his work, Dr. i~ichol1st an economist, states his viet.
of the place of religion in the southern traditional value complex.
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"In my initial prospectus of this book, I also intended to include as
another element in the Southern tradition its t other-l~orldly reI igion. t
ROlIever, upon further reflection, I decided to omit this important matter. Even so, I should perhaps make explicit the extent to \-lhich, quite
apart from the lessons of soc ial science, my mID maturing interpretation
and application of Christian teachings have influenced my attitudes tm'l ard
race relations. I have been forced to conclude that, quite apart from
their economic and social aspects, traditional Southern racial attitudes
inescapably have a moral aspect as Hell. That so few of my co-religionists
in the South seem to see this moral issue never ceases to discourage and
amaze me. It is a paradox that the South, \-Jhich by every objective standard
is the most religious region in j~~n~rica, could be so blind to the practical
implications of Christianity. Someho\.J the Southern religious tradition has
never progressed from the Old Testament t s God of Vlrath to the New Testament's God of Love and Brot herhood, nor from an ethereal concern for the
other \vorld to a concrete moral concern for social injustice in the here
and nOH. In my vie\~, Southern religious attitudes have been hopelessly
schizophrenic and outrageous ly se If -righteous."

t!icholls, p. 163.

The place of religion in the traditionalism of the South is far more intimate
and involved than might appear at just a glance. A brief historical sketch Hill
be necessary to set this in perspective.
It is a fairly common historical generalization that the modern ,'1 0rld, or
the past three or four hundred years, resulted from the convergence of Protestantism as a religious syster'l , democracy as a political s~7stem, science and technology
as a s y stem of research and development, and capitalism as a system of economics.
These ma j or value and organizational themes emerged from the ~omb of medievalism
unevenly and in someuhat different birth orders. Yet the kinship betueen them and
the mutual reinforcement one of another have provided much of the dynamic and core
value orientation of the modern \Jestern uorld. This has become something of a
modern western \1orld synthesis replacing the medieval synthesis.
A classic study of the relationship bet\leen relig ion and economic life in
modern culture is that of Hax '\:eber. Centrally i 'e vJas his thesis that the

Hax Ueber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, translated
by Talcott Parsons, Ue,·) Yor~~, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958.

emergence of Protestantism provided the ethos uithin uhich capitalism t laS endmled
"ith divine support as a tvay of 1 ife. This occurred, according to Heber, with the
thrmling off of the traditional religious or i entations of medieval Catholicism
through the radical Protestant doctrines of predestination, salvation, and calling.
This puritan ethic \las developed vlith varying doctrinal emphases by calvin and his
follmlers, the Dap"cists, and ~!esley and his Nethodists. It "las not Heber's contention that any of these men or movements set out l1ith the manifest purpose to
develop the foundations for an economic system or even a rationalizing principle
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undergirding it. They uere devoted to the reformation of the central religious
tasks of the \'J Orship of God and the salvation of souls. Nevertheless, these protesting religious movements, along l'l ith associated and, often, ' conflicting forces
did rob medieval man of his spiritual security Hithin the Catholic Church and of
his traditional modes of economic and political behavior. Early Protestants had
to worle out the assurance of their salvation in the world around them. The discipline and rationalism of the monastery as a holy calling tJere, in effect, thrust
into the open community and into the economic and political spheres. The making
of money, the expansion of capitalistic enterprises, and the eruption of the Industrial Revolution, as 'Hell, parenthetically, as the expansion of knotJledge and the
spread of democracy, became principal fields in t.Jhich men lvorked out their spiritual
destinies. This constituted breaks, often radical and revolutionary, l;fith medieval
traditionalism. Traces of the historical effects of these processes can still be
observed in Europe in that the more Protestant parts, in general, have pushed
ahead further in the fields of economics, democracy, and science than the more
Catholic portions.
The United States has probably been the major critical testing ground of this
modern societal development. In the early days it was predominantly settled by
Protestant colonizers. They came seeking religious freedom and economic opportunity. Those t4ho settled in the northern part of the country seemed to stress religious freedom most and to develop economically fastest. Those settling in the
South seemed primaril y concerned uith economic e~cploitation and Ie ss ~'lith the
Protestant ethic. Due to a variety of factors, the southern settlers developed a
traditional economic pattern of agriculture, substituting the plantation system
l-1ith its cash crop and slavery for the manorial system of England "lith its relative self-sufficiency and serfdom. In the early days Protestantism dominated the
religious composition of the United States, llorth and South. In the north, it
flourished, largely led by left-uing Protestants, along uith the beginnings of an
industrial economy, t]hile in the South it formed an alliance under the dominance
of the Church of England, the right-uing of the Reformation, Hith the aristocracy
of the planter class. ~ J ith the rise of the industrial economy o f the North, the
Puritans became captains of industry and the call for workers brought thousands
and millions of Catholics from agrarian Europe to industrial America. Thus, by
the end of the First ;70 rld '; :'a r the Protestants, uhose ethic ,,,as historically
associated t1ith the Industrial Revolution in Europe, found themselves dominant
in the agrarian traditionalism of the plantation South, .,hile the Catholics,
associated uith peasant agriculture in Europe, pushed touard the top in the industrial cities of the North.
Religiously the South has been as Protestant as it has been Democratic in
politics. Again, it is a peculiar southern brand of Protestantism. This is best
illustrated by the dominance of the Southern Baptist Church in every state in the
Southeast. It is the sect-type form of Protestantism t"hich, stripped of its
denominational peculiarities, t;faS dominant in the rest of the country fifty to
one hundred years ago. One has only to attend a General Conference of The t1ethodist Church to note that Nethodists in the South tend to vieH Christianity through
glasses tinted by the "southern uay of life." This applies also to Roman Catholics,
according to a recent study of a parish in net>] Orleans.
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Sect-type Protestantism stresses individualism in religious experience
with little attention to social theory or ethics. Traditionally, concern is
lJith personal morality rather than social problems, ~1ith surface cures rather
than bas ic causes, \'l ith salvation by enthusiasm rather than evangelism. In spite
of outstanding exceptions, southern Protestantism has tended to endoH the "southern
\'lay of life" t"i th divinity, defending it against all comers. The fact that prophetic voices in pulpit and peu are today increasingly vocal in criticism of l1hat
was formerly defended is obviously disconcerting and confusing to many traditional
Protestants.
Although Protestant denominations have been in competition and rivalry with
each other, this has been more in the nature of the various factions of state
Democratic parties, largely all of one piece, rather than serious challenges growing out of fundamentally different interpretations of religion. The results have
been a relatively lOll percentage of the population in religious membership in
comparison to the nation, a surplus of substandard churches too small in membership and too limited in program, and a general 10~J level of professional training
for the clergy.
Although this southern brand of Protestantism places excessive stress on the
Bible, giving the South the religious nicl~name "The Bible Belt," knouledge of the
Bible, in spite of educational efforts, is eJ:tremely lmJ. In a test given at a
southern state university, out of one hundred possible correct ansHers, one half
of the test group of over five hundred students scored fetl1er than seventeen correct responses. In a test in the open community in the Southern Appalachian
Nountains, the most Protestant of the Protestant South, the average score tJas 55.7
(out of one hundred) tIith a UeH Testament score of 6~.7 and an Old Testament score
of 45.6. A local church Immlledge test in the same area yielded an average score
of 30.3. Almost t~Jice as much 1;'JaS l~notm about the Bible as the church. The individualistic, nonsocial responsibility vieu of religion is seen in a community
participation score only around one-fourth as high as the church participation
score. Religious attitudes tlere found to be fundamentalistic and sect-type in
character.
For several years religious membership has been grouing more rapidly than
the population. From 1926 to 1952 the population increased by 33.7 percent uhile
selected religious bodies increased 57.~ percent in the United States. In the
Southeast, the population greu more rapidly by 37.0 percent, but religious membership increased even more rapidly by 6G.L~ percent. The Pentecostal and Holiness
denominations increased during this period by 532 percent in the nation and
1,000 percent in the South. Church of God bodies increased 260 percent in the
nation and 659 percent in the Southeast. Various Lutheran bodies (those with
membership listed in the 1926 Census of Religious Bodies and the 1952 Church
Distribution Studies of the Hational Council) ranl::ed fourth in size and greu by
132 percent in the nation and 98 percent in the South. The Seventh Day Adventists
increased 128 percent in the nation and 229 percent in the South. The American
and Southern Baptists combined increased 100 percent in the nation and 106 percent
in the South. The Evangelical and Reformed Church increased 60 percent in the
nation and 22 percent in the South. The Roman Catholic Church increased 59 percent in the nation and 77 percent in the South. The Brethren bodies, Nethodist,
Presbyterians, Congregational Christians, Disciples of Christ, Protestant Episcopal, and Jeuish bodies all increased at rates 10~Jer than the average for the

6

country as a Hhole and in the Southeast. Some of these groups increased less
rapidly than the population. It is apparent from this analysis that the socalled "third force" in Christendom, the 10,Jer-c lass sect-type "people's churches"
of today, are the most rapidly grouing groups in the nation and even more so in
the South. Yet, churches tJith established and liturgical traditions (Roman Catholics and Lutherans) are also grot.Jing more rapidly in the nation and in the South
than the average. The Protestant Episcopal Church is grm'Jing much faster in the
South than in the nation as a tJhole and JeHish bodies are grovling more than t~Jice
as rapidly in the South as in the nation.
Pe need only project these trends to find a picture of much greater pluralism 'tJith a bi-modal grm]th pattern composed of Holiness and sect-type groups, on
the one hand, and liturgical and established traditions, on the other hand. The
in-betueen denominational types (Methodists, Disciples of Christ, etc.) haVe
relatively lou groHth rates, both in the nation and in the South. Thus, the religious ferment in the South seems largely f ired by the revival outburst of louerclass sectism and the missionary outreach of the great liturgical churches. That
this trend is continuing to the present time may be seen by comparing the grm'J th
rates of various churches from 1950 to 1962 in the United States and the Southeast.
In the United States, the Catholics increased l!·5.8 percent and in the Southeast
104.3 percent; the Southern Baptists L!.l~.O percent and in the Southeast 36.4 percent; the £'lethodists 14.5 percent and in the Southeast 15.3 percent; and the
Presbyterians U.S. 31.6 percent and in the Southeast 31.5 percent. The Presbyterians Here grmJing more rapidly than the Methodists in every state in the
Southeast. The Catholics uere increasing faster than the Presbyterians in every
state except Kentucky and more rapidly than the Southern Baptists in all states
of the Southeast. The Southern Baptists \Jere grm;)ing more rapidly than the Presbyterians in all states of the Southeast except Alabama, Georgia, and Kentucky.
The Methodists \·J ere the slm~est grmJing of all these denominations in all these
states.
The Church today in this region is challenged by its traditional identification t-Jith the so-called "southern uay of life." Historically, the Southerner
uas rooted in the plantation system, in a segregated bi-racial pattern, in states'
rights, and in fundamentalistic Protestantism. This southern synthesis has been
as much sanctioned and endoued tlith divinity by Protestantism as ever Has the
medieval synthesis by Catholicism. Indeed, it survived the Revolutionary Har,
the development of American denocracy, and 1i1as shal,en only by the defeat in the
Civil Far. Today the movement of the sectional South into the mainstream of
American life, ideologically and economically, is har.lpered by the inability of
large segnents of the southern brand of Protestantism to disassociate themselves
from traditional ruralism and agrarianism, segregation, the one-party system,
states' rights, anti-intellectualism, anti-trade unionism, and traditional puritanical behavior proscriptions.
Just as the monolithic might of medieval Catholicisfo1 over the values, motivat ions , and practices of men had to be brol~en before the developments of the
modern uorld complex of capitalism, deli.l0Cracy, and science \'l ere possible, so the
dominance of traditionalistic Protestantism, in its peculiar southern form, must
loosen its hold on the mind of the South before the region can enter fully into
the pluralistic mainstream of American economic, sOGial, political, and religious
life. Although brealdng, the traditional southern synthesis is by no means broken,
especially in rural areas.
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This situation poses unique intellectual and moral problems for the churches
in the South. They find themselves in the peculiar position of bringing judgment
to bear upon Hhat they formerly sanctioned, and both in the name of the same gospel.
Yet the churches uhose earliest biblical traditions include a custom-breaking
Christ and Christians who turned things upside dmm must learn again to be a saving
and living leaven in the traditional lump, a source of stability and direction in
the ceaseless and often disoriented changes taking place in the South, in the
nation, and in the Horld.
The decennial census of the population by the U. S. Bureau of Census provides, of course, the basic source of data for a study of demographic characteristics and changes. In 1960 the United States reported 179.3 million population, an
increase of 18.5 percent since 1950. Slightly under a third of this population
(54.9 million) nas in the Census South, an increase of 16.5 percent during the
decade. Thus, the United States as a T;lhole vlas grm'J ing more rapidly than the
South, largely due to the very rapid groHth in the Hest. The '-lhite population,
on the other hand, was grotJing slightly more rapidly in the South (18.0 percent)
than in the United States (17.5 percent). The nomJhite population, mostly Negro,
was gro\Jing more than tuice as rapidly in the United States (26.7 percent) as in
the South (ll.l percent). In 1960, Negroes made up 10.3 percent of the U. S.
population and 20.6 percent in the South. The l!egro population increased 25.2 percent in the U. S. and only 10.3 percent in the South.
In 1960, 69.9 percent of the U. S. population ,,,as returned as urban, "ith
the 30.1 percent rural population divided unequally bet~Jeen rural-farm (only 7.5
percent) and rural nonfarm (22.G percent). The increase in the urban population
in the United States during the past decade T:las 29.3 percent. In the South it
'Jas at a much faster rate of growth (40.1 percent). The rural nonfarm population
(mostly suburban and built-up population around to''lns and cities) increased
slightly more rapidly in the United States (30.2 percent) and slightly less
rapidly in the South (37.6 percent) than the urban population itself. Hot-lever,
the rural farn population declined (-)lH.7 percent in the United States and
(-)50.2 percent in the South. This decline "Jas so great that, in spite of the
rapidly grolJing rural nonfarm population, the total rural population in the
country lost (-)0.3 percent and in the South (-)5.9 percent. During the past
decade, the South moved from 43.6 percent to 58.5 percent of its population
urban. Thus, for the first time, more than half the population in the South Has
urban in 1960. In 1950, 25.2 percent of the South's population "JaS rural-farm,
and this dropped to 10.8 percent by 1960.
In 1950, there were 169 8etropolitan areas in the United States, and this
increased to 212 in D60. The comparable figures for the South were 59 metropolitan areas in 1950 and 76 in 1960. The total metropolitan population increased
33.0 percent in the United States and 52.7 percent in the South. The gr0l4th inside the central cities Has 16.3 percent in the U. S. and 37.7 percent in the
South. Actually, the greatest areas of groHth Here suburban, '-lith 55.9 percent
increase in metropolitan population outside the central cities in the United
States and 78.5 percent increase in the South. Small cities, under 50,000 popUlation, are much more important in the South than in the nation as a l~hole. This
may be seen in the fact that the metropolitan population made up 90.1 percent of
the total urban population in the United States but only 35.4 percent in the South.
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The age and sex structure of the population provides important clues to
the productive-dependency situation and to churches attempting to minister to the
spiritual needs of all the people. In the United States as a uhole, 32.2 percent of males and 30.2 percent of females uere under 15 years of age, while those
65 years and older made up 8.5 percent of the males and 10.0 percent of females.
For nonwhites, those under 15 comprised 38.7 percent of males and 36.6 percent of
females I nhile those 65 and over tJere 6.0 percent for males and 6.3 percent for
females. This meant that 59.5 percent of total males were in the productive age
groups betueen 15 and 65, as lIell as 59.9 percent of females. This lJaS 55.3 percent for nonuhite males and 57.2 percent for nontlhite females. Thus, it is obvious that the productive lJorkers among nomlhi tes must support a larger proportion of nont,Jorkers than is true for uhi tes.
In the total South, 33.7 percent of males and 31.7 percent of females t-lere
under 15 years of age, l>1hile 7.7 percent of tta.les and 9.0 percent of females uere
65 and over. In the total population in the South, a smaller proportion of persons in the productive age groups must support a larger proportion of young and
old dependents. This picture, houever, is accentuated by the large proportion of
nonwhi tes in the South. This may be seen in the fact that 31.0 percent of vJhite
males and 30.0 percent of uhite females u ere under 15 years of age, compared to
40.7 percent of nom·Jhite males and 33.1 percent of nonuhite females. It is the
case that. due to better medical facilities, more ,Jhites than nonuhites are in
the 65 and over age groups in the South. This lJas 0.0 percent for lJhite males,
9.5 percent for uhite females, in contrast to 6.6 percent for nontlhite males and
7.1 percent for nonuhite females. Yet overall, the dependency ratio is higher
for the South than the United States and highest of all for nont.Jhites in the South.
The burden falls upon those segments of the population uith a surplus of lmJincome and a deficit of high-income jobs.
In 1960, 63.8 percent of ' males and 65.8 percent of females 14 years of age
and over were reported married, 25.5 percent of males and 19.2 percent of females
':-Jere single, 3.6 percent of males and 12.2 percent of females vJere uidoned, and
2.1 percent of males and 2.0 percent of" females uere divorced. ' The uhites had a
s light tendency to be more married Hhile the nonuhites had more single, lJidovled,
and divorced persons. The llhite population in the South lJaS the most " married
and the nonwhite population the ieast. HmJever, there Has less divorce among the
nont-1hites of the South than of the nation.
Traditionally, the natural increase rate has been higher in the South than
in the nation as a Hhole. Around 1910, for example, the gross reproduction Has
44 to 59 percent higher in the South than in other regions, due largely to the
dominance of the farm population. Since \Torld Har II the gap between the fertility
in the South and in the nation has been growing smaller. For exar,lple, in 1960,
the average number tif children under five per l,doo llomEm 15 to L~9 years old in
the 'nation tlaS only about L:. percent belm.J tlie average ' of the rates in the southern
states, ,jhereas in 1950 it ~Jas about 12 percent louer. The slmmess in the groHth
rates of the southern population, then, has been due largely to net outmigration.
This outmigrationbecame heavy for liegroes and uhites follm'J ing Horld Har I.
This was the period during which immigration quotas reduced the migration of population from outside the ' country. Huch of this migration has been from farms to
cities. Nore than a third of the South's farm population uas lost through net
migration from 19L~0 to 1950 (5.5 million). Every state in the South, excep1::ing
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Florida, Virginia, and T~cas, lost population by net outmigration from 1950 to
1960. Only Florida sho~Jed any appreciable gain through migration (5(3.3 percent).
The greatest losses Here recorded b y Arkansas (-22.7 percent), Nississippi
(-19.9 percent), and Kentucky (-13.2 percent). Four states gained through net
migration of Hhites. Three of these gained ver y small amounts: Virginia,
Louisiana, Texas. Florida gained 70 percent (1.5 million) or enough to cause
the southern states to receive 52,000 more Hhites than migrated out. The net
number of nom.Jhites migrating out during the decade totalled 1.4 million. Only
Florida and Louisiana had a net gain o f nomJhites through migration, TJ1ith the
remaining southern states losing in a range from (-)2.7 percent for TeJcas to
(-)35.0 percent for Arkansas. Other states having large proportions of nonHhites
lost through migration uere Hississippi (-32.7 percent), South Carolina (-26.5
percent), and Alabama (-22.0 percent).

Allan P. Sindler, editor, Change in
Duke University Press, 1963, p. 31.

~

Contemporary South, Durham, U. C.,

In 1960, 32.5 percent of the nonnhite population of the United States was not
living in the state in ~~hich they l-Jere born, and this · t1aS 29.2 percent for the
t'Jhite population. For those still in the South in D60, a larger percentage Has
living in the state of birth (83.0 percent for nomJhites and 71.1 percent for
l·, hites). The higher rate of r"obilit~7 for nonuhites for the United States may be
further seen in the fact that 52.1 percent had changed residences from 1955 to
1960, and this HaS L~9. 8 percent for tJhites. i\gain, nonuhites remaining in the
South l'J ere less mobile (L~7.3 percent). Houever, 53.7 percent of the \·, hites had
changed residences froru 1 955 to 1960. Even so, this meant that 52.4 percent of
the population five years and older in 1960 had changed residences during the
past five years in the South. If this process were equally spread over a decade,
no one Hould be living in the same house as Hhen the previous census lJas taken.
Uhile mobility could not be extended in a straight line this way, obviously, many
people move more than once in a five-year period. This is a picture of very
great movement of population and it has important consequences for the Church.
Generally speaking, persons u it h less than five years of schooling are considered functional illiterates. In 1950, for the U. S. as a whole, 11.1 percent
of the population 25 years of age and over uere illiterates, and this nas 18.l~
percent in the South. There were considerable i mproveiJents so that illiteracy
had dropped by 1960 to O. '-~ percent in the nation and 14.0 percent in the South.
For t-Jhites, this Has 6.7 percent in the nation and 10.0 percent in the South;
for nomJhites 23. L:. percent for the nation and 31.7 percent for the South. In
1950, the median school years completed for the nation lJaS 9.3 and in the South
8.6, a difference of 0.7 years. In 1960, the nation reached 10.5 and the South
9.6, a difference of 1.0. Thus, for the total population, there had been improvements in the South and in the nation, bu t the lag betlJeen the South and the nation
had increased in terms of median years of school completed. For the ' Jhite population 25 years of age and over, the median years of school completed for the nation
Has 10.9 and for the South 10.4, a difference of 0.5. For the nonuhites in the
U. S. the median Has 8.2 and in the South 7.1, a difference of 1.1 years. In the
complex occupational structure of the modern technological order, less than high
school graduation mal:: es it difficult for persons to absorb the technical training
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necessary for skilled jobs. \1ith unskilled jobs decreasing and unemployment
rates increasing among those tJithout high school graduation, education through
high school and beyond becomes extremely important. Yet in 1960, 59.0 percent
of the total U. S. population 25 years of age and over had 11 or fel',-Jer years of
school completed and this ''las 64.6 percent in the South. The comparable figures
f9r the ..,hites ,~ere 56.9 percent for the U. S. and 60.2 percent for the South,
Hhile there 'Jere 78.3 percent for the U. S. and 85.0 percent for the South among
nonwhites. These t'l ere, in every case, the percentage of the adult population
\lith less than high school graduation. It is obvious that educational forces
in the nation, aod especially in the South, have much unfinished business in
the years ahead,
It is anticipated that the South t>1ill hold, perhaps t"ith very slight losses,
its present proportion of the national population. The estimated population in
1963 was 188.8 million for the United States and 58.2 million for the South,
30.8 percent of the '~otal. By 1970 the U. S. population is projected at 211.4
million and the South 65.1 million. The present guess for 1980 is 252.0 million
in the United State$ and 77.6 million in the South.
From "Econolllic Problem number One" to "Economic Opportunity I·l umber One"
since the Great Depression, the South has moved more rapidly than the nation as
a 1',-10ole along several economic indices. It is clearly departing from its old
agrarian status as a supplier of ra'J materials for northern manufacture and
moving tOl',Jard incre~1?ing industria1izat ion.
Southern agriculture itself is changing uith less hand labor and more mechanization, ",ith larger commercially profitable farms, better trained farmers, fet.Jer
subsistence and substandard farms, and a great reduction in sharecropping and
tenancy. The inoome of famers is far belml that of other segments of the labor
force. The average ipcome for the nonfarm population in 1959 lIas $2,202 and for
tl1e farm population $9(50. Uhat is true of the nation as a t'Jhole is exaggerated
in the South. For example, the level of living inde)c for 1956 lIas 145 for U. S.
farmer~ and 119 for farmers in the Soutq,
These trends have been accompanied
by a deorease in the number of gainful ~lOrl~ers employed in agricu Iture. One
hundred years ago, 50 percent of all gainful Horkers "ere employed in agriculture,
,.,ith l~O percent in nonagricultural pursuits. Today it. is around 10 percent in
agriculture tIith 90 percent in nonagricultural jobs. From 1950 to 1960, in the
South, the nunber of persons 14 years of age and older engaged in agriculture
dropped from 3.2 million to 1.7 raillion ( ...Lj·6.6 percent), l1ith the negro loss
only 1.6 percent greater than the uhite. In 1960~ there t1ere 1.2 million tIhite
and 0.5 million Uegro vlorl~ers in agriculture in the South. This dramatic decline
in the number of lJorkers in agriculture has beep accompanied by a phenomenal increase in the productivity of the farms and over-provision for food and fiber
for the nation, Around the turn of t~ century, every farmer produced enough for
himself and seven others, l"hile today he supports himself plus 28 others. Nuch
of this increase in efficiency has been achieved since the last Har. Indeed,
agricultural output has been increasing more rapidly than our population, even
during the so-called population explosion,"" Using the years from 1910-1914 as
100, the index numper for population groHt.h in 195.:3 uas 133 and for farm output
197. The farm output t-Jas 22 percent higher in 1953 thsn in 1948. This has been
accompanied by a decrease of the fann and rural population with the usual impact
upon rural institutions, especially country churches. Agricultural ghost tot-JUS
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and villages are appearing. Hotl1 to keep religion alive and hopeful in the midst
of decline and decay is a sobering problem confronting hundreds of village and
country churches today. Can the church become a Itt-Jell of living water" in the
"institutional deserts" of declining population areas?
The great shift has been in the grotl1th of manufacturing. It is well known
that the proportion of the labor force in manufacturing is a good indicator of
the economic ~Je11-being of the people. In the South, in 1958 this \vas 21.4 percent, co[apared to 33.L~ percent in the Northeast. Furthermore, much of the employment \>1as of the type making use of relatively cheap, unskilled labor, abundant
tl1ater supply, and raw materials. Exceptions were the rapid manufacturing grmvth
areas in the Gulf Crescent and in a fet-1 other subregions throughout the South.
Net~ plants tend to settle largely in or near metropolitan areas, but it is a poor
Sind1er. p. 44.

town in the South today that does not have or is not searching for a factory of
some sort.
The South increased the ntlmber of persons employed in nonagricultural establishments by 26 percent from 1950 to 1963, uhile this lIas 25 percent for the
nation as a ~,'ho1e. The value of foreign commerce in the South increased 11.2 percent to 3.4 percent for the United States from 1962 to 1963, with greater improvements in exports than in imports. Bank deposits increased 103.7 percent from 1950
to 1963 in the South and 37.3 percent in the nation.
The South's share of the gross national product has been grm"ing during and
since the war. l!e~~ construction nOH is increasing at about the same rate in the
South as in the nation and should reach 17.2 billion in 1965. Retail sales are
expected to increase by 34 percent for the United States and by 38 percent for
the South. The registration of motor vehicles is projec
to grow by 36 percent for the country and l~L~ percent for the South from 1955 to 1965. These are
indicators of the dramatic economic changes taking place in the South.

Summarized from John L. Fulmer. "Southern Economic Development, 1955 to
1965: A Look Ahead, It Southern Economic Journal 23, April, 1957, 411-420.
The median income per family moved from $3,073 to $5,560 in the U. S~ ·. from
1950 to
1%0. In the South, the gain t-1as from $2,248 to $4,465. Hhile the
changes in the purchasing value of the dollar uould make these gains look less
impressive, the gap bet~~een the median incomes of families bet~Jeen the South and
the United States actually \lidened during the decade. The poverty population is
being defined as families of four ui th under $3,000 income. Family income here
is not provided by size of family, but 21.4 percent of the families in the United
States reported under $3,000 income and this >:'las 33.0 percent in the South. The
improvements from 1950 may be seen in the fact that at that time 46.0 percent of
the United States families reported under $3,000 and 60.9 percent in the South.
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It is t'l ell knotm that Im,1 income families tend to be larger than high income
families, especially in the South. This means that a much larger proportion of
the poverty population is concentrated in the South than in the nation as a
whole. A closer look Hill indicate some of the reasons for this. Using the
median income in 1959 of persons Hith income, rather than of family incomes,
this was $4,103 for males in the United States and $3,044 in the South. In the
U. S. urban population, this uas $4·,532, $3,701 in the South; rural nonfarm population, $3,297 in the U. S., $2,427 in the South; rural farm population, $2,098 in
the U. S. and $1,467 in the South. The l"Jhite males in the United States had a
median income of $4,319 and in the South ~3,473 compared to the nonl1hite male in
the United States of $2,273 and in the South $1,615. Since the South has a larger
than average proportion of its population rural and nont-lhite, these facts depress
the median income of persons in the labor force. These differentials between the
United States and the South hold for professional, managerial, and technical
people ($6,640 for U. S. males and $5,984 for southern males), farm managers
($2,136 for U. S. and $1,3Cl for South), craftsmen, foremen, and so on ($5,240
for U. S. and $4,31L~ for South), operatives and other factory \17orlters ($4,282 for
U. S. and $3,196 for South), farm laborers and farm foremen ($1,107 for U. S. and
$865 for South), and other laborers ($2,940 for U. S. and $2,039 for South).
Obviously, the relative income position of the South has improved since 1929.
In 1929, for example, the range by states in the percentage of the per capita personal income of the national figure 1;las from Sotlth Carolina (38 percent) to Florida
(74 percent). In 1960, the range uas from Nississippi (53 percent) to Florida
(89 percent). Virginia increased from 62 percent of the national level in 1929
to 83 percent in 1960, North Carolina from 48 percent to 71 percent, South carolina from 38 percent to 63 percent, Georgia from 50 percent to 72 percent,
Florida from 74 percent to 89 percent, Tennessee from 54 percent to 70 percent,
Alabama from 46 percent to 66 percent, l-.iississippi from 41 percent to 53 percent,
Arkansas from 11·3 percent to 60 percent, Louis iana from 59 percent to 72 percent,
Texas from 68 percent to 87 percent, and Kentucky 56 percent to 69 percent.
Sindler, p. 34.
The per capita income in 1950 was $1,660 for the United States and $1,195 for
the South. In 1963, the United States had moved to $2,443 and the South to $1,956.
Thus, Hhile improvements lJere seen in the South and the United States, the gap tJas
somel.1 hat larger in 1963 than in 1950. The long-term relative improvements seem to
be slo';ling do~m.
A study of the occupational structure indicates that there are proportionately
more people engaged in low income occupations in the South than in the country as
a tJhole. For example, there are feHer male professional and technical wor1~ers in
the South (8.7 percent) than in the United States (10.3 percent), more farmers
(7.2 percent in the South and 5.5 percent in the U. S.) and laborers (8~3 percent
in the South and 6.9 percent in the nation). In the South, the contrast is due,
to a large extent, to the differences between the tJhite and the nonuhite populations. For example, in the South, among employed whites, 9.9 percent ~.ere professional and technical workers, contrasted to 2.9 percent for nonwhites; managers,

13

off icials, and proprietors (12.6 percent for uhites and 1.5 percent for nom-1hites),
craftsmen (20.5 percent for l-1hites and 8.G percent for nonwhites), farm laborers
(3.0 percent for tIhites and 1l.4 percent for nontIhites), and other laborers
(5.2 percent for l~hi tes and 22.9 percent for nonuhites). Thus, the similarities
betHeen the t.Jhites in the United States and in the South are much greater than the
total male tmrkers in the United States and in the South or the loJhite and nom1hite
male uorkers in the South. ~1evertheless. the South has a surplus of low-wage
earners and a deficit of high-income people in the occupational structure.
Another aspect of the economic picture has been the grot.Jth of trade unionism.
From 1939 to 1953, total union membership increased 143.0 percent for the United
States and 187.5 percent for the South. South carolina had 307.4 percent grot-1th
during this period, and several southern states increased by over 200 percent in
union membership. Continued unionization of t10rker& 'may be expected in the future.
The South has already been the battleground for much labor-management strife, and
this, too, may be expected to continue.
In spite of these astounding changes in the economic position of the South,
poverty is still a dominant characteristic for great se~aents of the population.
There are not in the nation two greater depressed groups than rural farm Negroes,
especially in the Old Plantation South, and the uhite subsistence farmers and exminers in the mountains. Fortunately, outmigration is heavy among both these
groups, but human problems of training, re-training, uelfare, medical care, and
common decencies are great. These are becoming national problems involving the
receiving cities of the North and Hest as uell as the depopulating sending areas
of the South.
Politically, the South is a victim of the one-party system. The Democratic
Party has controlled the state governments of all except the border states for
over half a century. In spite of the grouing urban centers, political pot>1er remains in the courthouse gangs of rural and declining counties. Only occasionally
have state officials emerged from their "states' rights" cocoons to vieu realistically the national, to sa~l nothing of the international, scene. The internationalism of the southern senators and representatives a decade or so ago seems to
have given t-1ay to a neu isolationism. The South may be replacing the Niddle ('J est
as the locale of isolationism in a uorld Hhere the doctrine is more out of date
than eve.r. The one-party rule in the South has not faced critical political competition or debate for so long that a curious type of Southern Democratic Party has
emerged. This southern brand of democracy, ~Jith the blessings of the southern
brand of religion, HaL ted for the Supreme Court to out 1avJ the uhi te primary and
the county unit system in Georgia, and to order reapportionment and the desegregation of public schools. It is more often at odds tJith the national Democrats
than t'lith the Republicans. It is not only conservative but reactionary in many
of its aspects. It is little uonder that election machinery disfranchises not
only Negroes but, also, thousands of liberals through a lacl~ of adequate political machinery "hereby any viable choice is possible. An illustration of this
dilemma nas the situation in many southern states uhich made it impossible for
Democrats to vote for the na'cional Democratic ticket for the presidency in Uovember, 1960. The effort in the 1%4 election to \'1 in the most reactionary and conservative elements of the Democratic Party over to .the Goldt-Jater brand of
Republicanism is another aspect of this picture. A continuing result of this
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situation is a lower percentage of eligible citizens registered and voting in the
South than in the rest of the nation. In the 1956 presidential election, for
instance, several states in the Hiddle Uest and Uortheast had three-fourths of
their citizens of voting age actually voting, ~Ihile this did not reach SO percent
for any southern state and dropped to 22.1 percent in one state. This is due
partly to lethargy among "Ihites but more largely to the failure of Negro voters
to register and vote. There are counties in southern states l-li th from 50 to 80
percent of the population negro and no registered Negro voters at all.
One of the most visible characteristics of the South is the bi-racial nature
of its population. There are relatively feH foreign-born \l1hi tes but around onefifth of the population is Negro, bIice the national average.
In 1850, about all the t1egroes lived in the South uhere they composed 37.3
percent of the population. Since then there has been a steady decline of negro
percentage of the population in the South, and it stands today at roughly onehalf the proportion of one hundred years ago. From 1800 to 1950 the Hhite population gre>J more rapidly than the 11egro, but the latter seems to have stabil ized
at around 10 percent of the national population. There has been a great increase
in the negro population outside the South. Sometime bettveen not-) and 1970 there
t>Jill actually be more llegroes living outside than inside the South, and for the
first time since lCOO there should be feuer l!egroes in the South in 1970 than in
1960. Thus, the program of l1egro-tlhite relations is rapidly becoming a national,
instead of a distinctively Southern, problem and must be dealt \~ith in the light
of national rather than regional ideals and purposes.
It is against this type of background that the present push for equality of
opportunity and access to public facil ities on the part of negroes needs to be
understood. The 1 95i.!· Supreme Court decision in the public school field ,,,as only
the most important of a ~·]hole series of such decisions implementing the American
ideals of freedom and equality. In 19SL!·, seventeen states and the District of
Columbia required racial separation in their schools. In 1962, eight years later,
only 7. 3 percent of the l!egro pupils Here in integrated schools, and this lIas
0.4 percent in the Resistant states and 51.1 percent in the Compliant states
(DelatoJare, D. C., Kentucky, Haryland, Hissouri, Oklahoma, and H st Virginia).

J. Kenneth 11or1and, Token Desep;regation and Beyond, Southern Regional
Council, Atlanta, Georgia, p. L~.

Y7hen the uhite primary l1as declared uncons 'citutional in 19L:.4, only around
5 percent of voting-age Uegroes tlere registered to vote. This increased sharply
to 25 percent by 1956 and stood at 23 percent in 1960 uith variations by states. In
1940, less than 0.5 percent of the l!egroes "ere registered in I:1ississippi, Alabama, South Carolina, and Louisiana. Registration ranged from 2 percent in Georgia
to 16 percent in TeJcas. In 1960, only 6 percent uere registered in 11ississippi,
14 percent in Alabama, 23 percent in Virginia, and no data for South carolina or
Georgia. Other states ranged from 30 percent in Texas to 48 percent in Tennessee ..
There '-J as the tJidest variation in negro registrations by counties uithin states,
from 89 percent of the counties in l1ississippi having less than 10 percent

15

registered to Tennessee uith 29 percent of the counties shouing 90 percent or more
registered. These voter registrations for t;egroes Here most highly associated or
correlated uith such factors as the percentage of nonuhite labor force in tJhitecollar occupations (+.23), nOnlJhite median school years completed (+.22), nontJhite
median income (+.19), and percentage of total church membership Roman Catholic
(+.15). Registrations uere negatively correlated vlith the percentage of population Negro, 1950 (- .• L!.6), percentage of population Negro in 1900 (-.41), percentage
of farms operated by tenants (-.32), uhite median school years completed (-.26),
percentage of labor force in agriculture (-.20), percentage of population belonging to a church (-.17), percentage of total church membership Baptist (-.10).
Sindler, pp. 124-12 3 .
Under the impetus of the various voter registration efforts, a report from the
Southern Regional Council indicates that 598,345 nonuhites l-lere registered from
April, 1962 . through Ljay, 196Ll· in the South. At present the registered nom-Ihites
make up 12.2 percent of the total registra·tion and 3 L!•• 9 percent of the nomlhites
of voting age population. The t"hites constitute 87.7 percent of the total registration and 62.8 percent of the tlhite voting age population.
- It is almost inconceivable that much of the southern brand of Protestantism
has and still does approve of these conditions and does little to champion the
cause of voter registration for uhites, much less llegroes. This is simply another
evidence of the southern churches raising uhite supremacy to the level of the
Godhead.
Uith the very recent passage and signing into lau of the Civil Rights Bill,
a dramatic climax has been reached in the post-Uorld Har activity in the field
of race relations. These activities have involved courts, legislatures, executive
branches of government, voluntary groups, business groups, and the churches.
Hriting in the summer of 1 952, John B. Frank stated the folloHing:
"The ttJenty-five years just past have seen an amaz ing re-establishment
of moral opposition to racial discrimination in the United States.
Indeed, though it t]ould be impossible to prove, I suspect that in the
past fifteen years the proportion of the whole population which has
shared a sense of deep ob j ection, on moral grounds, to mistreatment of
Ilegroes, is quantitatively greater than the proportion of the population l1hich felt that objection in 1866. Once again, the courts have
both gone along " i th and promoted this moral objection, and a series
of judicial decisions have substantially brought the modern meaning of
equal protection of the lalls."
S.indler, p. 67.
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Yet the road ahead is long and hard.

Frank points to

" ••• at least three hard consequences of the three hundred years
which desegregation, by itself, Hill no-t affect: (a) poverty, with
all its consequences. (b) a depressed and defensive outlook on life,
with all this may mean in terms of meeting community responsibilities.
That Negroes may gain the right to vote does not, for exar,l ple, mean that
they "t-1 ill necessarily exercise it for a long time to come. The child
who turns a classroom, segregated or unsegregated, into a blac~board
jungle is the child Hho entered from a street that ,Jas an armed camp, and
desegregation may not affect his motivations at all. (c) learning limitations. These are the products today both of generations and of a personal lifetime of undernourishment and unintellectual environment. Ho
amount of desegregation Hill make equal and educational opportunities
for these t\-10 pupils: one born illegitimately to an eighteen-year-old
mother, not l~nmJing his father t having no home but a crm.Jded room, nQ
balanced and adequate nourishment, no touch of intellectual stimulus
or even interest in the Horld beyond his street; the other born to a
fairly routine middle-class background, adequately fed and housed,
moderately traveled, his school progress an object of close attention
by both parents. Heaningful educational opportunities for number One
requires considerably more than putting him into the same classroom as
Number Two."
Sindler, p. 85.
Dr. Edgar Thompson of Duke University speaks of the present day South and
the Second Emancipation.
"If emancipation involves freedom to move it also involves freedom to
appear. As slaves negroes '-1 ere hidden auay on the private estates of the
planters and as migrants to the cities they '.Jere concealed behind the
walls of the ghetto slums. Slavery consists not only in being deprived
of freedom to move but also in being denied a public and visible existence.
The changes ~le nmJ are \"3i tness ing describe a process of negroes rising
into public sight from their previous obscurity in city ghettoes.
They
are putting in an appearance in the theaters, on the streets, on the highHays, on the trains and buses, in the voting booths, and in the schools
and colleges. They are ever)"-lhere, in places '1here before they rarely
ventured. They are conspicuous, they are out in the public, they are
being noticed. They are, in short, being emancipated a second time.
"He are living in an age of 't'10rldtJide er,l ancipations. All sorts and conditions of people--'t'1Omen. children, teen-agers, sectarians, ,1Orkers, natives,
colonials, peasants--ai~ being emancipated from real or fancied states of
oppression all over the '-l orld. Again ue hear much talk of the t natural r
rights of man, a kind of tall~ 't'1hich tells more about situations of change
than it does about Hhat natural rights are, but all these people seeking
more freedom agree on at least one natural and inalienable right in common and that is, the right to complain aiJout their lack of rights. They
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are complaining so effectively that the holders of traditional status powers
are recognizing rights of sone sort on the part of those surging up from
belo~ ) and demand i ng theia .
"The second emancipation of the n egro, the American phase of this Horldstatus struggle, is more fundamental and, for the future, far more
important than the first one. Its present manifestations--such as freedom
rides, restaurant picl~eting, school and universit y desegregation. and other
events uhich cotfu-:tand the head1ines--may be mere surface manifestations of a
more profound change taking place in the ethos of the negro and an earnest
of changes taldng place or about to take place in the basic structure of
Southern society. The first emancipation gave iJegroes freedom to move
around and to choose their mm employers, but it ~-Jidened rac ia1 distances
and made Southern institutions much more racially exclusive. Legal
slavery disappeared lJith the first emancipation, but the idea of race,
'tJhich in part originated as a rationalization of slavery, became an
end-valt!e in itself and uent even deeper into the structure of Southern
society than before."
~~ ide

Sindler, pp. 111-112.
The efforts of llegroes to attend uhite churches on a nonsegregated basis, the
so-called "kneel-ins," must cause sensitive churches to hang their heads in shame.
Negroes have been seated on a nonsegregated basis by some congregations and refused admission by others. The picture of Christians, perhaps of the very same
denomination, being refused admission to services of Horship because of color
presents a problem of great urgency to church leaders. As a church "Ie can say
little that is more than double tall~ about schools, voting, and economic opportunities until ue see that all people have equal opportunities for t'l Orship and
religious education.
These are evidences of an enduring tradition of racial separation in travail
and transition.
These and other trends point to a soc1e~y in transition. Rapid social
changes aluays involve disorganization and disorder. Social problems are 1il~el y
to be produced on the bacl~ s i de, so to say-; by a region in social crises, even
in cases \Jhere the changes themselves may be deemed desirable. Social problems
arise from conflicts in values, from loosening of traditional ties, from differential rates of change, and from unexpected social emergents. An example is the
rending of personal and social moral ties in rapid vertical or horizontal mobility.
The disorganization occurring in persons and families in moves from the rural
delta or mountains to the urban Hest or north is measured in rising rates of
juvenile and adult crimes against pe r son and property, broken homes and the homeless aged, unemployment and uelfare probler.ls, mental and emotional difficulties.
The need for prison reform and the rehabilitation of prisoners is great indeed
in the South. In recent ,-JorL~ in this f i eld, it nas discovered as a Horking
hypothesis of many prison and parole officials that religion contributed little
to the rehabilitation of prisoners upon release into the open community. Inter-
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generational ties become tenuous in the face of family dispersion. Schools,
clubs, churches, and mass communications are poor substitutes for parents,
grahdparents t and other relations in the socialization of the young into a
strong and stable moral structure. For example, the almost exclusive dependence
on age-graded peer groupings in social, recreational, and educational affairs~
in, the absence of firm intergenerational ties in the background, however necessary and useful, tends to produce truncated socialization, emotional ~yopia,
and e"cessive "nmmess" in value orientations. Adolescent turbulence ' is only
the most disruptive of the uneasy llinds that blot) through our age-graded superstructure uhen the intergenerational familistic foundations have been ~1eal~ened.
In the long run t cultural crisis and social probler.J.s exist nOtJhere except in the
minds of human beings. Social problems are important only because they produce
problem persons and are problems to people. The Church is in the business of
socializing the young and re-training the old in the best of the past to meet
the changing present and to prepare for an uncertain future. The Christian faith
has an unusual stake in this process because at its best it concerns the core
values of the past, is realistic about the fleeting frailties of the present,
and is hopeful about the ultimate outcome of the future under God.

